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Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an 
Effective Cap-and-Trade Program to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his message accompanying the United States 2009 Budget, 
President Barack Obama noted,  
[T]here are the years that come along once in a generation, when 
we look at where the country has been and recognize that we need 
a break from a troubled past, that the problems we face demand 
that we begin charting a new path. This is one of those years. 
 Our nation indeed faces many challenges.1 One such challenge that 
has risen to the forefront of both the national and global conscience 
is that of global warming.  
While politicians and the media continue to debate the validity of 
global warming,2 an increasing number of the world’s preeminent 
scientists believe that “warming of the climate is unequivocal and 
that the world is in a crisis now.”3 Coupled with the fact that 
President Obama and a majority of Congress are proponents of 
reducing greenhouse gases,4 the United States may implement an 
emissions regulatory program in the near future. The United States 
moved closer to this reality when, in June 2009, the U.S. House of 
Representatives approved the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act—a bill that would substantially reduce air pollutants by the year 
2050.5  
If the United States ultimately elects to lower greenhouse gas 
emissions, it will likely select from one of two regulatory approaches: 
 
 1. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 1 (2009) [hereinafter OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET], available at http://www. gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf. 
For example, “[o]ur economy is in a deep recession that threatens to be deeper and longer 
than any since the Great Depression.” Id. 
 2. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595, 
597 (2007).  
 3. Bill Westerfield et al., EBA Climate Change Primer: Cap and Trade, 29 ENERGY 
L.J. 173, 174 (2008). 
 4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 13.  
 5. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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either a “cap-and-trade system” or a “carbon tax.”6 In a cap-and-
trade system, a regulatory body sets a cap on the amount of 
allowable carbon emissions; rights to emit carbon under this cap are 
then allocated to the regulated entities.7 Ideally, some entities will 
need less than their allocable lot, and other entities will require more 
than what is distributed to them. This creates a market for emission 
rights where entities that need additional permits to pollute may 
purchase supplementary units from those who pollute less.8 Carbon 
taxes, in contrast, are much simpler: they tax pollutants based on 
their concentration of carbon.9  
This Comment argues that a carbon tax is the preferred 
regulatory approach; however, its political unpopularity makes it an 
unlikely solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A cap-and-
trade system, the ugly step-sister to a carbon tax, is the most 
probable alternative. To be successful, it must be “dressed up” and 
include several key components, including (1) a firm cap, (2) a one-
hundred percent auction of allowances, (3) “carbon offsets,” (4) a 
characterization of carbon in the same manner as a currency, and (5) 
enforceability. 
This Comment focuses, in particular, on the difficult choices 
policymakers face in determining how to address global warming. 
Part II provides an overview of global warming. It explains the 
current scientific research on climate change and discusses the threats 
that global warming poses. Part III explains United States reluctance 
to admit that climate change is a problem and why it is in the United 
States’ interest to implement a system to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Part IV discusses the two leading regulatory approaches to 
reduce carbon emissions—a carbon tax and cap-and-trade system—
and argues that a cap-and-trade system is the most feasible solution. 
Part V introduces several key components that a cap-and-trade 
system must possess to be successful, and Part VI concludes this 
Comment.  
 
 6. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 
1574–75 (2008). 
 7. See Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2008); see also Leila Abboud, Paying to Pollute: Everything You 
Wanted to Know About Cap and Trade . . . But Didn’t Even Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
15, 2008, at R12. 
 8. Abboud, supra note 7. 
 9. Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 
POL’Y 67, 67 (2008). 
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II. GLOBAL WARMING 
Although still highly debated, for purposes of this Comment, I 
will assume that the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis is 
valid and that prompt action is needed to curtail human effects on 
the climate. In analyzing this issue for its validity, it is helpful to 
review the collaborative efforts of those who seek to draw consensus 
from the world’s scientific community10—individual reports may 
provide some insight, but they are less reliable than collaborative 
efforts.11 This Comment will focus on data and reports compiled by 
organizations—such as the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (“IPCC”)—that are subject to extensive peer 
evaluation and scientific analysis. 
The IPCC was promulgated to review and publish objective 
reports on climate change.12 This organization does not perform any 
research or collect any data of its own; rather, it assesses on a 
“comprehensive, objective, and transparent basis the latest scientific, 
technical, and socio-economic literature produced worldwide 
relevant to the understanding of the risk of human-induced climate 
change, its observed and projected impacts and options for 
adaptation and mitigation.”13  
The IPCC is a scientific intergovernmental body created by the 
World Meteorological Organization (“WMO”) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”). It consists of, and is 
open to, all nations that are members of these two organizations, as 
well as hundreds of scientists from all over the world who are chosen 
 
 10. Gary Bryner, Reducing Greenhouse Gases Through Carbon Market, 85 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 961, 961 (2008). 
 11. Id. Some of the individual reports are unreliable because of their bias, exemplified by 
the reports spawned by corporate groups with ulterior motives. “Exxon Mobile, for example, 
has led a long-running campaign designed to mislead the public about the threats of climate 
change.” Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and 
Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1882 n.276 (2008). A memo outlying the 
company’s strategy illustrates this point. The memo stated that “[v]ictory will be achieved 
when uncertainties in climate science become part of the conventional wisdom.” Id. (quoting 
Environmental Defense, Too Slick: Stop Exxon Mobile’s Global Misinformation Campaign, 
http://action.environmentaldefense.org/EDF_Action_Network/alertdescription.html?alert_i
d=244798).  
 12. http://www.ipcc.ch/organization.htm 
 13. Id. 
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by their governments to provide pro bono work as authors, 
contributors, and reviewers.14 
The IPCC has taken the position that it is “‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ 
that anthropogenic [human-caused] increases in greenhouse gases 
are causing climate change, and that climate change will have 
significant effects.”15 Experts believe that climate change is due in 
large part to the growth in carbon dioxide emissions—the 
predominant anthropogenic gas.16 Although the world has seen 
increases in the emissions of greenhouse gases since pre-industrial 
times, the most notable changes occurred over the past forty years. 
In 2004, for example, carbon dioxide emissions were eighty percent 
higher than in 1970. The most dramatic increase occurred during 
the last decade due in large part to increases in the consumption of 
fossil fuels.17 Furthermore, in 2005, the level of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere overwhelmingly surpassed levels that have existed for 
650,000 years.18 
The growth in anthropogenic gases has led to the warming of 
the earth’s climate system. Over the past fifty years—when the largest 
growth in levels of carbon dioxide occurred—the rate of temperature 
increases has nearly doubled from levels seen during the prior fifty 
year period.19 The last two decades have also seen some of the 
warmest recorded temperatures. For example, the average Northern 
Hemisphere temperatures from 1950–2000 were “very likely higher 
than during any other [fifty]-year period in the last 500 years and 
likely the highest in at least the past 1300 years.”20 
The IPCC believes that rising temperatures are the cause of the 
consistent increase in sea levels over the past fifty years, as well as 
decreases in arctic ice, mountain glaciers, and snow cover.21 Even 
 
 14. Id.; see Bryner, supra note 10. 
 15. Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1870.  
 16. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 36 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at http://www. 
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (“[Carbon dioxide] represented 77% of 
total anthropogenic [greenhouse gas emissions] in 2004.”). 
 17. Id. at 36–37. 
 18. Id. at 37. 
 19. Id. at 30. 
 20. Id. Although global temperatures have increased, the effect is not uniform; the 
greatest increases are found around the North Pole. Id. The Arctic’s temperature has increased 
nearly twice as much as the global average rate. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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though some regions have seen significant increases in precipitation 
since 1990, droughts are more prevalent and affect more regions 
than they did forty years ago.22 Some argue that the effects of climate 
change are minute and that it is only a future problem; its effects, 
however, are already visible. Changed temperatures, for example, are 
already causing severe weather patterns. The tropical cyclone 
Hurricane Katrina exemplifies the potential physical and economic 
consequences natural disasters pose. Increased temperatures are also 
impacting the earth’s physical and biological systems:23 it is predicted 
that “global warming will eliminate 15–37 percent of the species 
now on the planet.”24  
The problem with climate change is that to combat its effects, 
significant change is required. Current regulations do little to slow 
the effects of climate change, and carbon emissions will likely 
continue to grow.25 Moreover, the carbon dioxide that is already 
present in our atmosphere will continue to contribute to global 
warming for centuries to come because carbon cannot readily be 
removed from the atmosphere.26 This indicates that temperatures 
may continue to increase despite valiant efforts to curb future 
emissions.  
Because increases in the earth’s temperature will likely occur, 
efforts to stop global warming are futile. But even though it is 
impossible to stop, the world can slow global warming to mitigate its 
effects. Scientists, in general, have concluded the increase in global 
temperature should be limited to two degrees Centigrade to mitigate 
the damage that global warming will cause.27 To accomplish this, the 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 31. 
 24. Pierce, supra note 2, at 598. 
 25. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 16, at 44. 
 26. See id. at 47. For example, about one-half of the carbon dioxide released in the year 
1907 is present in today’s atmosphere. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1579. Even if it 
were possible to eradicate our current carbon emissions, in 2107 ninety percent of these 
emissions would linger in the atmosphere. Id. 
 27. Bryner, supra note 10, at 965. Scientists fear that  
if the average temperature increases by more than two degrees Centigrade . . . the 
planet would enter into uncharted waters, where the temperature would be hotter 
than it has been for hundreds of thousands of years and would create an 
environment much different than the one in which current life has evolved.  
Id. 
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world’s current emissions rates need to be reduced by sixty to eighty 
percent of 1990 levels by the year 2050.28  
III. THE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY IS ADMITTING 
THAT YOU HAVE A PROBLEM 
With many preeminent scientists in agreement that carbon 
emissions are causing our earth’s temperature to rise and that this 
change will have significant impacts, it seems surprising that the 
United States has heretofore been reluctant to address this issue.29 
When one examines the situation, however, several factors become 
apparent that explain why, until recently, the United States has 
declined to admit that there is a problem: the United States is the 
world’s largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, the United 
States may actually stand to benefit economically from global 
warming, and proposals to address climate change receive opposition 
from constituencies on both the right and the left of the political 
spectrum. Despite these hurdles, the United States should actively 
promote a policy to reduce its, and the world’s, greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
A. Contributors to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Greenhouse gases, unlike some other pollutants, are especially 
challenging because they pose threats not only to the locale where 
they are emitted, but also to the rest of the world. For example, 
carbon dioxide—the major contributor to global warming30—
 
 28. Id. 
 29.  The United States, for example, failed to join international collaborative efforts to 
curb greenhouse emissions when it refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol—an international 
agreement which required its member states to reduce emissions to 5% below 1990 levels. 
Joshua P. Fershee, Levels of Green: State and Regional Efforts, in Wyoming and Beyond, to 
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 WYO. L. REV. 269, 276 (2007); see also United Nations, 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998, at 3 art. 
3, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng/pdf. The United States has 
also paid little attention to climate change domestically. Fershee, supra, at 270 n.5 (quoting 
Peter Baker & Steven Mufson, Bush’s Climate Remarks Weighted for Policy Shift, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 27, 2007, at A1) (“[T]he 2007 State of the Union address was ‘the first time in Bush’s six 
years in office that he mentioned [climate change] in a State of the Union.’”). 
 30. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity 
Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 58 (2008); see also Federico Cheever, Everyone Complains 
About the Weather, but No One Ever Does Anything About It: Interjurisdictional Failure to 
Designate Responsible Parties for the Climate Crisis, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 765, 777 (2008) 
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emitted in the United States would have just as great an impact on 
increases in global temperature as would the same proportion of 
carbon dioxide emitted in Thailand; regardless of locale, emissions 
are all trapped in the same atmospheric bubble.31 Thus, because of 
carbon emissions’ worldwide effect, it is reasonable to assume that 
those nations who historically and currently emit the most carbon 
dioxide would oppose efforts to reduce emissions. The rationale for 
their opposition is twofold: (1) admitting that global warming is a 
problem may result in penalties for those countries who contributed 
the most to the current carbon emissions stockpile, and (2) it is 
reasonable to estimate that those nations who are the largest 
polluters will bear the heaviest cost to reduce their emissions.32 
Table 1 illustrates the largest emitters of carbon dioxide as of 
2004. 
TABLE 1. “SHARE OF GLOBAL EMISSIONS, 2003 AND 2004”33 
 2003 2004
United States 22.7% 22.0%
Europe34 16.9% 16.3%
China 15.3% 17.5%
India 4.1% 4.1%
Japan 4.9% 4.7%
Africa 3.5% 3.4%
Russia 4.2% 4.2%
 
The United States, which had “long led the world in greenhouse 
gas emissions,”35 was the largest emitter in 2004, followed by China 
 
(“Carbon dioxide constituted 84.6 percent of greenhouse gases emitted in the United 
States.”). 
 31. Rose, supra note 7, at 106. 
 32. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1567, 1576–77. 
 33. Id. at 1577 (referring to DEP’T OF ENERGY, INT’L ENERGY OUTLOOK, DOE/EIA-
0484, 81 tbl.A8 (2007), www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html). 
 34. Posner and Sunstein’s measurements for Europe refer to only those European 
nations that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”). Id. at 1577 n.67. The following European countries are members of OECD: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id. (citing OECD, 
Members and Partners,  http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3147,en_36734052_36761800_ 
1_1_1_1_1,00.html). 
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and Europe. China, in 2007, supplanted the United States as the 
world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases.36 It is therefore 
unsurprising that both China and the United States have not 
accepted a proposal to limit their carbon emissions.37 What may be 
surprising is that Europe, the third leading emitter of carbon 
dioxide, has accepted a proposal to limit its carbon output.38 Perhaps 
Europe’s acceptance of such a proposal can be explained by the fact 
that its carbon emissions were already decreasing before it signed the 
agreement. This is illustrated in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. “RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL CARBON 
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY/REGION (APPROXIMATE 
PERCENTAGE OF WORLDWIDE EMISSIONS)”39 
 1990 2003 2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
U.S. 23.5% 22.7% 22.0% 20.1% 19.4% 18.8% 18.7% 18.5% 
Europe 19.3% 16.9% 16.3% 14.6% 13.4% 12.4% 11.6% 10.9% 
China 10.5% 15.3% 17.5% 21.1% 22.4% 23.9% 25.0% 26.2% 
India  2.7% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 4.4% 4.7% 4.9% 5.0% 
Japan  4.8% 4.9% 4.7% 4.1% 3.8% 3.5% 3.3% 3.0% 
Africa 3.1% 3.5% 3.4% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 
 
The United States and China are both projected to maintain 
their position as the world’s leading emitters; however, China’s 
proportion of global emissions is expected to be substantially greater 
than the United States’ by 2030.40 This is due in large part to the 
explosive growth in China’s emissions over the past two decades 
compared to the rest of the world.41 
 
 
 
 35. Id. at 1567. 
 36. Id. at 1579. 
 37. Id. at 1567. 
 38. The European Union’s carbon marketplace opened in 2005. EUROPA, EMISSION 
TRADING SYSTEM (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en. 
htm. 
 39. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1578. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 1578–79. 
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TABLE 3. “CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS CHANGES, 1990–2004”42 
 1990–2004
China 108.3%
United States 19.8%
India 87.5%
Russia -24.8%
 
Thus, if the United States and China emit as projected, they will 
continue to potentially place their own populations, as well as other 
nations, at risk to the negative impacts of climate change.43  
B. Disparate Impact of Global Warming 
The United States’ hesitance to address climate change can 
further be explained by the fact that scientists predict that the 
American economy will remain relatively unaffected by increases in 
the earth’s temperature.44 Estimates prepared by two Yale economists 
indicate that global warming will not uniformly affect the world’s 
nations, at least in terms of Gross Domestic Product.45 Nordhaus 
predicts that “annual global output” will likely be reduced by 3%—
which would have enormous consequences—while Mendelsohn 
predicts the United States’ annual output would only be reduced by 
a negligible .03%.46 The lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that 
while the cause of climate change is not proportionally distributed, 
neither are its consequences.47 
The United States, which has contributed the most to the 
existing stockpile of carbon in our atmosphere, would remain 
relatively unaffected economically by climate change and may in fact 
experience small gains.48 China, the current leader in emissions, and 
Russia would also stand to profit from climate change. Both of these 
 
 42. Id. at 1578. 
 43. See id. at 1567. 
 44. Id. at 1581–82.  
 45. Pierce, supra note 2, at 597. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 771 (“[A]lthough wealthy countries are responsible 
for most of the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they will . . . face less 
damage than poor countries.” (quoting Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir Chella Rahan, Immigration 
Could Ease Climate-Change Impact, 434 NATURE 435, Mar. 24, 2005)). 
 48. Pierce, supra note 2, at 598. 
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nations are expected to benefit from increased agricultural 
production due to warmer temperatures.49 Nevertheless, despite 
overall gains, some regions within these nations would be 
detrimentally affected. States in the American southwest, such as 
Oklahoma, would likely not benefit from increased temperatures and 
may, in fact, be adversely affected due to drought.50  
In addition to the United States and China, the world’s most 
affluent nations are the most protected from the effects of climate 
change.51 Three reasons have been posited why these nations will 
fare better. First, they are more capable of adapting.52 These nations 
have the resources to implement new technology to cope with global 
warming. Second, the strength of their economies is not reliant on 
agricultural output.53 This should be contrasted with the agricultural 
economies of India and Africa. These nations are generally regarded 
to be the biggest losers in regards to climate change and are 
expected to suffer significant losses in agriculture and health.54 
India’s agricultural economy, in particular, would suffer significant 
losses from climatic changes to the monsoon, on which it relies for 
agricultural production.55 Third, the wealthiest nations are less 
vulnerable to temperature increases because they are located in 
“cooler, higher latitudes.”56 Thus, some increases in temperature are 
likely to substantially benefit nations with traditionally cooler 
temperatures, such as Russia and Canada. A rise in temperatures 
would not only increase Russia’s agricultural production, but it 
would also significantly reduce heating costs.57  
C. Global Warming: A Catch-22 
If the wealthiest nations fail to address climate change, the 
poorest nations, which contribute the least to the supposed causes of 
 
 49. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1581–82. 
 50. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 598; Cheever, supra note 30, at 771. 
 51. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1580; see also Cheever, supra note 30, at 771.  
 52. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1580. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 597–98; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 
1580–81. 
 55. Pierce, supra note 2, at 597–98. 
 56. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1580.  
 57. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 598. 
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global warming, would be most affected.58 But if the United States 
takes steps to reduce its carbon output through the imposition of 
environmental regulations, the resulting increase in prices would be 
passed on to consumers.59 Some observers have claimed that any 
efforts to reduce emissions in the United States, as well as the world, 
are elitist and push down poor people.60 Because of the possible 
disparate impact on poor people, opponents of legislation to stop 
climate change can appeal to both conservatives and liberals.61 
Accordingly, global warming is in essence a Catch-22, where we are 
essentially “damned if we do” and “damned if we don’t” take steps 
to successfully reduce carbon output. 
D. The United States Needs to Act 
Although, as previously stated, there are several reasons why the 
United States would not want to take regulatory measures to reduce 
its carbon emissions, it should implement a reduction policy and 
choose a method that could be implemented by the rest of the 
world. Such a plan could benefit the United States in helping the 
country (1) mitigate the negative environmental impacts of climate 
change, (2) maintain its leading economic and political position in 
the world, and (3) uphold its standing as a world leader.  
Even assuming that the United States will not be as adversely 
affected economically as other nations by climate change, global 
warming still poses significant environmental risks. For example, 
global warming has been linked to natural disasters. Hurricane 
Katrina demonstrated the United States’ vulnerability to tropical 
cyclones and the heavy human and economic costs associated with 
these storms.62 The United States has significant coastlines and 
valuable property that will be affected by tropical storms and rising 
ocean levels. 63 Prolonged and more severe droughts in the American 
southwest also pose significant threats to the U.S. water supply.64 
 
 58. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1580–82. 
 59. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 55. 
 60. See Robert Hardaway, Carbon Markets in Context: Into Which Component of 
Holdren’s Equation Do They Fit?, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 983, 986–87 (2008). 
 61. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 60–62. 
 62.  See Louise K. Comfort, Cities at Risk: Hurricane Katrina and the Drowning of New 
Orleans, 41 URB. AFF. R. 501, 507 (2006). 
 63.  See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1841. 
 64.  Id. 
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In addition to environmental concerns, the United States would 
benefit economically from carbon regulation. As of 2008, the 
international market for the right to emit carbon was valued at $64 
billion, an astounding number when compared to its relatively 
humble beginnings—$200 million—in 2003.65 The growth of the 
international market for carbon is largely due to the development of 
the European Union’s Trading System, which accounts for sixty-five 
percent of the market.66 Currently the United States, the leading 
contributor to the existing stockpile of greenhouse gases, is only a 
nominal player in the global carbon market.67 This is largely due to 
the fact that the U.S. market is primarily driven by voluntary 
participation, as opposed to Europe’s mandatory participation as a 
signatory of the Kyoto Protocol.68 “Now, with everyone from 
PepsiCo to Google to Pearl Jam striving to offset their carbon 
footprints, placing a value on carbon reduction has become 
commonplace.”69 The United States needs to take advantage of this 
growing market and design its own mandatory participation system. 
In order to maintain its political clout throughout the next 
century, the United States needs to reduce its emissions and 
encourage the world to do so as well. Though observers project that 
the U.S. economy will fare better than most nations, these same 
observers expect China and Russia—two of its major political and 
economic rivals—to fare even better.70 The United States needs to 
do what is within its power to proactively address this concern. 
Regulating carbon emissions and creating a system that would 
encourage world participation is one effective method of achieving 
this goal. Not only would the United States maintain its political 
position by spearheading this program, but it would also mitigate the 
substantial economic benefits that China and Russia would derive 
from climate change. The United States needs to lead the world in 
reducing carbon emissions because it is unlikely that either China or 
other developing nations—whose per capita rate of emissions are 
 
 65. Ann Grodnik & Radha Kuppalli, Investors Willing to Bet U.S. Carbon Market Has 
Legs, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 17, 2008, at 29. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (“The 2007 value of the U.S. carbon market was $331 million, or 0.5% of the 
global market.”). 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See supra Part III.B. 
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much lower than the United States’—would participate unless it 
leads the way.71  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: CARBON TAX VERSUS CAP-AND-TRADE 
There is a growing adherence to the prediction that if the world 
chooses to lower greenhouse gases it would do so through either a 
tax on the carbon content of fuels or a carbon cap-and-trade 
system.72 The majority of economists argue that a “price-based 
regulatory system”—such as a carbon tax—is preferable to a 
quantity-based scheme like cap-and-trade;73 however, it is unlikely 
that the world, and the United States especially, would choose a tax 
over other regulatory approaches.74 
A. Carbon Tax  
A carbon tax is a tax on fuels that emit high levels of carbon 
dioxide.75 Despite widespread support from economists,76 few 
politicians favor this approach.77 This is surprising because—when 
compared to other regulatory proposals—a carbon tax offers 
numerous advantages: it forces fuels to reflect their negative impact 
on the environment,78 it encourages technological innovation,79 its 
revenue can be used to reduce other taxes,80 and it is easy to 
administer.81 That said, the lack of political support for carbon taxes 
makes them an unlikely solution to global warming.  
The most common rationale for imposing carbon taxes on fossil 
fuels is that their current price does not accurately reflect the costs 
 
 71. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576 n.61. 
 72. Id. at 1574. 
 73. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842.  
 74. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 768 (noting that cap-and-trade is the most discussed 
and probable legislative solution to greenhouse gas emissions). 
 75. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67. 
 76. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842. 
 77. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 779–80 (citing Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative 
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 123, 123, 135 (2007), available at http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu 
/main/2007/12/taking-the-legi.html). 
 78. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67 (noting that a carbon tax is a tax on the carbon 
emissions produced by burning a fossil fuel). 
 79. Bryner, supra note 10, at 968; see Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991. 
 80. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601. 
 81. Id. at 600–01. 
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and damages (“externalities”) associated with their consumption.82 
Proponents of these taxes would argue, for example, that the cost of 
gas does not adequately account for the harm associated with the 
carbon dioxide emissions that are released when it is burned or 
reflect the effect this pollution has on physical health.83 The levy of a 
carbon tax would force such fuels to accurately represent these costs, 
and consumers, in turn, would demand cleaner products to replace 
the high-cost carbon-rich fuels.84 This corollary to a carbon tax—the 
effect on consumers—is imperative to the success of any regulatory 
plan because individual behavior accounts for a significant portion of 
U.S. carbon emissions.85 
If the carbon tax were set at the right level, it would also provide 
businesses with incentives to innovate.86 Regulatory proposals that 
set emissions standards on vehicles provide little incentive to design a 
vehicle that performs substantially below the proscribed emissions 
rate.87 Companies faced with carbon taxes, by contrast, would 
continually seek to develop more efficient products to decrease their 
tax burden and, in turn, increase profits.88 
Another significant benefit derived from carbon taxes is the new 
tax revenue it would generate; this could be used for several different 
purposes, including paying down the federal deficit.89 Liberals and 
conservatives alike are concerned with the United States’ increasing 
deficit. Several agencies within the federal government have also 
acknowledged this serious problem.90 A carbon tax can be specifically 
crafted to address this concern, and it is arguably a superior 
alternative to the political firestorm that would result from an 
 
 82. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 59–60 (estimating that 4.1 trillion 
pounds, or roughly thirty-two percent, of carbon dioxide in the United States in the year 2000 
was attributable to individual behavior). 
 86. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 968. 
 87. Id. (noting that taxes, as opposed to emissions standards, provide a continuous 
incentive to innovate). 
 88. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67. 
 89. See Westerfield, supra note 3, at 181 (noting that carbon tax revenues could be used 
to reduce other pre-existing taxes). 
 90. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601 (“The Federal Reserve Board has identified . . . [the 
U.S.] budget deficit as . . . [the nation’s] most serious long-term economic problem.” (citing 
Associated Press, Bernanke Warns of ‘Vicious Cycle’ in Deficits, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 18, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16688089/)). 
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increase in income taxes and reduced spending by the federal 
government to decrease the deficit.91 
Imposition of a carbon tax could also be used to offset or lower 
current federal taxes to minimize any possible negative economic 
consequences.92 Because of its relative simplicity, the tax could be 
evaluated periodically and adjusted to compensate businesses and 
social groups who are unduly injured by the tax.93 
A carbon tax is also one of the most effective regulatory 
approaches in providing stability and price predictability to the 
market.94 The tax would set the price of carbon, which would allow 
manufacturers and consumers to make energy-informed decisions 
about their future consumption in advance.95 This predictability 
provides stability to the market. A lack of stability is one of the 
serious grievances cited by businesses in the United Kingdom, which 
are regulated by a cap-and-trade system.96 Nearly two-thirds of all 
companies in the United Kingdom are dissatisfied with the 
unpredictable cap-and-trade market and would prefer a carbon tax.97 
Perhaps the overwhelming factor for this preference is their inability 
to make future financial plans on their business’s future energy 
costs.98 
Carbon taxes also better address timeliness and corruption 
concerns than would a cap-and-trade approach. The timeliness of a 
carbon tax is attractive because, if approved by Congress and the 
President, it could go into effect immediately.99 Additionally, the tax 
would likely be less susceptible to bureaucratic manipulation; it is not 
 
 91. See id. at 600–01. 
 92. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69; see Westerfield, supra note 3, at 181; see also Fershee, 
supra note 29, at 290 (commenting that Al Gore, an advocate of carbon taxes, “suggested 
using a carbon tax in place of some payroll taxes”). 
 93. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69. 
 94. Id. at 68. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. (“Over fifty percent of U.K. companies today are struggling with long-term 
strategic and business . . . decisions in the face of the current unstable policy and tax 
environment.”). 
 97. Id. (“[S]ixty-six percent of U.K. companies welcome the use of the tax system to 
provide incentives for them to become carbon neutral.”). 
 98. Id. at 67–68. Market instability from cap-and-trade is not unique to the United 
Kingdom. In the United States, for example, “tradable permits [for sulfur dioxide] have varied 
in price by over forty percent.” Id. 
 99.  Id. at 68. 
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allocated and it would apply to everyone.100 This removes the 
possibility of companies and individuals illegally paying for the right 
to receive extra allocations. 
Another benefit of the carbon tax is that it avoids some of the 
administrative difficulties that would likely be posed by the 
implementation of a cap-and-trade system.101 The tax is relatively 
simple to administer. “The carbon content of every form of fossil 
fuel is precisely known, as is the amount of [carbon dioxide] released 
when that fuel is burned.”102 And most businesses monitor their 
consumption of fuel.103 These factors would make the tax relatively 
simple to fit into our current tax system.104 Although a carbon tax 
may require a substantial reconstruction of the environmental and 
energy sections in the tax code,105 it is less abstract and more 
straightforward than cap-and-trade.106  
Unfortunately, its relative simplicity also makes it unpalatable. 
Because the carbon tax would be relatively clear and easy to 
understand, the public could readily see how such a tax would affect 
them.107 Any opposition would make it difficult to impose such a tax. 
One illustration of this difficulty is President Clinton’s failed attempt 
to introduce a carbon tax. His proposal to introduce a relatively 
small tax on hydrocarbons was immediately rejected.108 Thus, the 
transparency of the carbon tax makes it unlikely to gain support of 
politicians, especially when today’s carbon tax would likely have to 
be much larger than the small hydrocarbon tax proposed by 
President Clinton.109 Politicians’ fear of proposing a carbon tax is 
 
 100. Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842. 
 101. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 600–01 (noting the difficulty in global coordination of 
appropriate cap-and-trade baselines, price volatility, increased transactions costs, and potential 
corruption as consequences of a global cap-and-trade program). 
 102. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68 (citing Carbon Tax Center, Introduction, http:// 
www.carbontax.org/introduction/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 67. 
 105. Id. at 70. 
 106. Bryner, supra note 10, at 968. 
 107. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69. 
 108. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601 (“When President Clinton attempted to persuade 
Congress to enact a [carbon tax] . . . his proposal was pronounced dead on arrival in the 
Senate.” (citing Steven Greenhouse, Moynihan Predicts a Deal on Bigger Energy Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 1993, at A18)). 
 109. Id. at 601–02 (noting that an effective carbon tax would have to be twenty times 
larger than President Clinton’s proposed tax). 
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further illustrated by the fact that there are relatively few carbon tax 
proposals,110 and most notably, the U.S. House of Representatives 
recently opted to pass a bill that provides for carbon cap-and-
trade.111  
B. Cap-and-Trade 
Cap-and-trade is touted as the market-based solution to limit 
carbon emissions,112 and likely will be the approach that the United 
States adopts to combat climate change. Many American officials 
prefer this market-based method,113 and President Obama has 
advocated a cap-and-trade system and outlined a rudimentary plan to 
reduce carbon emissions through cap-and-trade in his 2009 
Budget.114  
Cap-and-trade limits pollution to a specific level (the “cap”) and 
distributes the right to pollute to those regulated under the cap.115 
These rights may be traded; thus, the system’s goals are met through 
limiting pollution to one’s allocable share or by purchasing rights116 
to exceed the allowance from those who are below their individual 
cap.117 It is important to note that although allocations may be 
traded, the cap remains fixed.118 The effect of a cap-and-trade is that 
it incentivizes participants to decrease their emissions so that they 
may realize the gains that may be achieved in selling rights to 
pollute.119 It is important that the cap is set sufficiently low so that 
 
 110. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 779–80 (citing Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative 
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 123, 123, 135 (2007), available at http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2007/ 
12/taking-the-legi.html). 
 111. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 701–05 (2009). 
 112. Tseming Yang, The Problem of Maintaining Emission “Caps” in Carbon Trading 
Programs Without Federal Government Involvement: A Brief Examination of the Chicago 
Climate Exchange and the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 271, 272 (2006). 
 113. Rose, supra note 7, at 92–93. 
 114. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 21, 100.  
 115. See Rose, supra note 7, at 91–92; see also Yang, supra note 112, at 272–73. 
 116. It is important to note that what is allocated under a carbon cap-and-trade is not 
physical, but rather, it is the right to emit greenhouse gases. See Jillian Button, Note, Carbon: 
Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on the Currency 
Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 571, 571 (2008). 
 117. Hardaway, supra note 60, at 990–91; see also Yang, supra note 112, at 273. 
 118. Rose, supra note 7, at 92. 
 119. Yang, supra note 112, at 273. 
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those regulated will need to trade in order to comply with the 
regulations. 
Cap-and-trade schemes are most successful when used to reduce 
prevalent, continuous problems rather than specific instances of 
pollution.120 A cap on carbon would address this concern because 
scientists believe it is the primary pollutant causing global warming. 
Further, cap-and-trade is most effective when the price of reducing 
emissions is not uniform across sources and there is a regulated 
market where those who can reduce their emissions at a cheaper cost 
can sell their extra allowances on the market.121 
Although this method is just one of the available approaches to 
reduce emissions,122 it is the method that Congress will most likely 
support.123 A plethora of both voluntary124 and mandatory125 cap-
and-trade systems in both the domestic126 and international127 
markets currently exist; however, the two most well-known programs 
are the U.S. Acid Rain Market and the European Emissions Trading 
System.128 
The U.S. Acid Rain Market, on which the Kyoto Protocol and 
many subsequent cap-and-trade models are based, is the best 
example of a successful cap-and-trade program.129 This “poster 
child” of cap-and-trade came to form in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.130 This Act set a cap on the emissions from coal-fired 
power plants that were causing acid rain.131 These plants were 
deemed to be responsible for ninety-five percent of the sulfur dioxide 
 
 120. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 73. 
 124. Examples of voluntary programs are the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development 
Mechanism and the Chicago Climate Exchange Program. Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991. 
 125. Examples of pending mandatory programs are the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, California Global Warming Solutions Act, and the Climate Stewardship Act. Id. 
 126. Examples of domestic markets are the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and 
Western Climate Initiative, which also includes Canada. See Button, supra note 116, at 571. 
 127. Some examples of markets outside of the United States are the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading System, United Kingdom’s Emissions Trading System, and New Zealand’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Id. at 571. 
 128. Hardaway, supra note 60, at 990. 
 129. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 177.  
 130. Rose, supra note 7, at 92. 
 131. Bryner, supra note 10, at 970. 
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in the northeast.132 In 1990 there were high levels of wet-sulfate 
deposition—“the predominant component of acid rain”—in the 
northeastern United States.133 Relatively quickly, this program 
produced sizeable reductions in the levels of wet-sulfate deposition 
in this region.134  
The program established a cap on the sulfur-dioxide that coal-
fired power plants could emit. This cap has been lowered over time 
to ensure that the environmental goals for reduction will be met.135 
The “[c]ap on [the] total emissions projected, by the year 2010, . . . 
[was set to decrease] sulfur dioxide emissions [by roughly] ten 
million tons from the 1980 levels.”136 In addition to providing clear 
guidelines on when the cap would be lowered, the program also 
specified from the onset how rights to emit would be allocated.137 
Although acid rain is still a problem—wet-sulfate deposition was 
reduced, not eliminated138—the U.S. Acid Rain Program is 
considered a success. Aside from the fact that the program reduced 
acid rain, the program has also been considered a success because it 
attained these results at a much lower cost than expected.139 
Prognosticators originally believed the program would cost $7 to $8 
billion per year; surprisingly, the program only cost $2 billion per 
year.140 This is an astounding result because this cost is roughly fifty 
percent cheaper than the cost of a command-and-control approach, 
which would have created a uniform emissions standard and would 
not have permitted trading.141 
The success of the U.S. Acid Rain Program catapulted cap-and-
trade to the forefront of the discussion on climate change regulatory 
methods. Although it should be noted that not all existing cap-and-
trade programs have successfully reduced emissions,142 the cap-and-
trade on sulfur dioxide “dramatically reduced acid rain at much 
 
 132. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 177. 
 135. Id. at 176. 
 136. Bryner, supra note 10, at 970. 
 137. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176. 
 138. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 971. 
 139. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 177. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Button, supra note 116, at 580. 
 142. For example, the European cap-and-trade is regarded as having failed to reduce 
carbon emissions. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842; see also Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68. 
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lower costs than the traditional government regulations and 
mandates of the past.”143 This program’s success has led to 
speculation that a global carbon market could significantly lower the 
cost of greenhouse gas emissions reductions.144 
Part of the reason politicians support cap-and-trade, as opposed 
to a carbon tax, is that the global carbon credit market has 
experienced tremendous growth.145 In the two years after the Kyoto 
Protocol went into effect (2005 to 2006) the global marketplace for 
carbon credits—the tradable unit of carbon under a cap-and-trade 
system—reached an annual value of over $30 billion.146 Experts 
expect that this market will continue to grow: its estimated value by 
the year 2020 is predicted to be $144 billion U.S. dollars, which 
“represents approximately one-fifth of the current total value of 
global trade in fuels.”147 
The existence of an international market for carbon is one of the 
major selling points for cap-and-trade. To successfully limit carbon 
emissions, any effort must be on a global scale and involve the 
United States, the European nations, India, China, and other major 
countries.148 If the United States unilaterally committed to an effort 
to reduce carbon emissions, its efforts would be negligible on global 
warming by the year 2100.149 Thus, a U.S. cap-and-trade system is 
popular because there is the possibility that it can function on an 
international level.150 
 
 143. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 21, 100; see Button, supra note 
116, at 580 (commenting that the success of the Acid Rain Program showed that it may be 
possible to reduce carbon emissions “up to fifty percent more cheaply than under a command-
and-control approach”); see also Bryner, supra note 10, at 969. 
 144. Button, supra note 116, at 580. 
 145. Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate Change 
Compliance: Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 44, 51 (2008). 
 146. Id. at 44, 51. 
 147. Button, supra note 116, at 591. 
 148. Pierce, supra note 2, at 600. 
 149. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576 (explaining that because the Kyoto 
Protocol did not place any restrictions on developing nations, “[f]ull compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol would have  reduced global warming by merely  0.03°C by 2100”). 
 150. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 969; Button, supra note 116, at 571–72 (stating that 
the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), a forum for existing and new 
governments looking to establish cap-and-trade programs, was established on October 29, 
2007, and that the European Union is encouraging governments outside of the EU to link to 
their market). 
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Cap-and-trade will also provide incentives for companies to 
innovate and develop new technology to reduce carbon emissions.151 
Additionally, the emission allowances may be sold in an auction, the 
proceeds, of which, can fund alternative energy projects.152 The use 
of these proceeds for clean energy, combined with the possibility 
that the carbon market could produce up to $100 billion annually 
for investment in poor nations,153 could serve the ultimate goal of 
reducing emissions. 
A notable characteristic of a cap-and-trade system is that the 
“future emission targets for reductions are fixed and known.”154 This 
emphasizes emission reduction rather than economic stabilization.155 
Thus, “[i]f accurately set, the cap ensures environmental protection 
goals are achieved . . . .”156 
The most important attribute of cap-and-trade, however, is that 
it is politically feasible. Unlike carbon taxes, a cap-and-trade program 
would not be plagued with the heightened opposition that proposals 
for higher taxes receive.157 Even though cap-and-trade creates a cost 
penalty charge much like a carbon tax, policymakers prefer it because 
it avoids the “T” word.158 Furthermore, the industrial constituencies 
of elected officials often prefer the idea of a cap-and-trade system 
because there is the possibility that this system will allocate free 
allowances.159 
Cap-and-trade is also advantageous because it shifts the 
discussion from who is actually responsible for climate change to 
what we should do about it.160 Any discussion about who is 
responsible would ultimately be detrimental to the United States, the 
largest contributor to the atmospheric greenhouse gas stockpile. The 
ability of cap-and-trade to shift the discussion on responsibility 
illustrates that the details involved in a cap-and-trade regulatory plan 
could get muddled, obscuring what is really going on. This can lead 
 
 151. See Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991. 
 152. Bryner, supra note 10, at 969. 
 153. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 51. 
 154. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69. 
 155. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 969–70. 
 156. Id. at 969. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601. 
 159. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 970. 
 160. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 768. 
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to corruption and manipulation,161 especially when oversight will be 
subject to reliance on fiduciary duties that have been compromised 
in the past and are not currently established on a global level. There 
is ample opportunity for self-interested parties to design the system 
in a manner that hinders competition or increases their standing 
within their respective industries.162 Additionally, in a market system 
the reason for price increases can be obscured.163 
Even though cap-and-trade has many positive attributes, it is 
subject to several criticisms. A cap-and-trade system, for example, is 
subject to market fluctuations. The possibility of an unpredictable 
carbon market, which leads to uncertain carbon permit pricing, 
could make compliance costs difficult to project.164 
The most difficult and problematic aspect of a cap-and-trade 
system, however, is its administration. For the carbon market, 
essentially a whole new market system must be created.165 Cap-and-
trade approaches are particularly troublesome because there are 
multiple questions to address: the ideal “cap, timing, allowance 
allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures, standards for use 
of offsets, [and] penalties . . . .”166 These difficulties are further 
compounded by the concern that cap-and-trade should be modeled 
after the Acid Rain Program—a program that operates on a notably 
smaller scale than what is envisioned for a carbon cap-and-trade 
system.167  
C. Choosing Cap-and-Trade 
Even though a carbon tax provides a quick, relatively simple 
alternative to reduce carbon emissions, it is not the most feasible 
alternative. Its main flaw is that it has relatively little political support 
and that much of the world’s attention has focused on a cap-and-
trade solution.  
 
 161. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 601. 
 162. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69. 
 163. Id. at 69. 
 164. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 969; see also Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991; Pierce, 
supra note 2, at 600–01. 
 165. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68. 
 166. Id.; see also Bryner, supra note 10, at 969 (commenting on the difficulty that arises 
when too many allocations are made and the uncertainty within which these decisions are 
made); Pierce, supra note 2, at 600 (commenting on the difficulty of setting emissions 
baselines). 
 167. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68. 
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Cap-and-trade provides a viable alternative to reducing carbon 
emissions because it can be implemented on a global scale and is 
promoted widely by elected officials. Because this system will likely 
be the model on which the United States and the world seek to 
combat climate change, we must pay particular attention to its 
construction to ensure its success.  
V. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE CAP-AND-TRADE 
The details of President Obama’s plan to institute a carbon cap-
and-trade system are vague, but it is clear that the administration 
intends to develop an economy-wide emissions reduction program 
that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although there are 
currently several carbon cap-and-trade systems in existence, none of 
these have been heralded as a success, and the European system, in 
particular, is largely regarded as a failure. Based on their relative lack 
of success, it is best to examine the model upon which these systems 
are based, the U.S. Acid Rain Program, rather than on its progeny. 
The U.S. Acid Rain Program, however, was relatively simple 
compared to what will need to be designed for a carbon market, so it 
can only serve as a reference point and not the model for a carbon 
emissions trading system. Thus, the following are suggestions of 
what a carbon market must include in order to meet its defined 
environmental goals and alleviate some of the possible collateral 
problems relating to its imposition.  
Perhaps the most significant aspect that must be kept in mind 
when creating a cap-and-trade system is that it must link to other 
international systems or be the model for an international cap-and-
trade program. This is important because if only the United States 
binds itself to significant cutbacks, the effect on global warming by 
the year 2100 would be minimal.168 It is likely that any effort to 
reduce emissions must not only incorporate the Europeans, but it 
must also incorporate China and India to be successful.169 Although 
the United States was able to act unilaterally in the fight against acid 
rain, the challenges posed by carbon emissions require international 
collaboration.170  
 
 168. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576. 
 169. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1830; see also Rose, supra note 7, at 99. 
 170. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576. 
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A. The “Cap” 
In President Obama’s 2009 budget he notes that his 
administration will work to create an “economy-wide emissions 
reduction program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
approximately 14 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, and 
approximately 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050” through a 
cap-and-trade system.171 This brief outline is vague and begs several 
questions: First, what does economy-wide mean and which emissions 
will be capped? Second, does a reduction of greenhouse gases mean 
that all greenhouse gases will be capped, or only carbon, the leading 
greenhouse gas? And third, are these reductions enough to reduce or 
slow global warming? 
To determine which emissions should be capped, it is first 
important to determine the origin of the nation’s carbon emissions. 
The bulk of carbon dioxide emissions, the leading greenhouse gas in 
the United States, come from the generation of energy, 
transportation, and industrial sources.172 The remaining carbon 
emissions come from “agricultural, commercial, and household 
sources.”173 Although the majority of current regulatory proposals 
target industrial emitters,174 these regulations may ignore the fact 
that individual behavior, including transportation and household 
emissions, is responsible for roughly one-third of U.S. carbon 
emissions.175 Thus, the majority of proposals seek to influence 
individual behavior only indirectly through increased product and 
energy prices. There are relatively few proposals that seek to address 
individual behavior directly; however, the United Kingdom’s 
environment secretary has proposed implementing a “personal 
carbon trading” system where citizens in the United Kingdom would 
 
 171. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 100. 
 172. Bryner, supra note 10, at 966 (commenting that one-third of all emissions come 
from the generation of electricity, 28% from transportation, and 19% from industrial sources); 
Cheever, supra note 30, at 777 (“Transportation and electrical generation are by far the two 
largest sectors, with industry coming in a distant third.”). Some observers suggest that the 
electricity sector is responsible for as much as 40% of the carbon dioxide emissions in the 
United States. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 180. 
 173. Bryner, supra note 10, at 966. 
 174. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 58. 
 175. Id. at 59–60. 
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be forced “to pay for their energy-intensive activities by spending 
allocated carbon credits.”176 
Although current regulations tend to focus entirely on industrial 
sources of carbon, a worldwide emissions cap-and-trade program 
would likely require a new approach. Perhaps a program that would 
address climate change indirectly would be more successful than a 
program that seeks to directly regulate individual behavior. This 
program would, at least initially, place a cap on the emissions of large 
industrial and energy producers. The program, however, would also 
seek alternative measures to reduce transportation emissions, such as 
emissions requirements on auto producers.  
By using an alternative program to address climate change, the 
decreasing cap proposed by President Obama could mitigate climate 
change—if the United States can convince China to make similar 
concessions. The eighty-three percent reduction of 2005 levels by 
the year 2050 should sufficiently limit global warming to the two 
degrees Centigrade level proposed by climate scientists.177 
B. Allowances 
There are two main questions that arise with emissions 
allocations: First, how to prevent over-allocation? And second, what 
method should be used to make these initial allocations?  
One concern with the distribution of allowances is that there is a 
“natural tendency” to over-allocate.178 To resolve this problem, one 
can look to the U.S. Acid Rain Program, which allowed a 
governmental agency—the EPA—to “ratchet back” allocations in 
the event that Congress granted too many allowances.179 This 
ensured that the integrity of the cap was maintained to meet the 
environmental goals of the program.180 This type of provision should 
be placed in any proposed cap-and-trade system because it would 
serve as a safeguard against intentional manipulation as well as the 
unintentional results that naturally arise from politicians fighting for 
their constituencies. 
 
 176. Button, supra note 116, at 579. 
 177. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. 
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The next concern is how to distribute these allocations—whether 
through an auction, free allocation, or some combination of the two. 
President Obama proposed that these allocations be given through a 
one-hundred percent auction.181 Direct allocations through auctions 
are important because they create more certainty; this allows 
businesses to make long-term financial decisions.182 Auctions are also 
favored by economists and environmentalists because the revenue 
generated can be used to further climate change goals, for instance, 
by funding alternative energy research.183 Auctions also simplify the 
method of allocating allowances:184 those who want them must 
purchase them. 
Furthermore, an auction also has the potential to raise, annually, 
billions of dollars.185 Even a moderate representation of the annual 
revenue that the distribution of allowances would generate is 
estimated to be $50 to $60 billion per year.186 Because of the high 
stakes and high incentives involved, some commentators have 
compared the distribution of allowances to the “opening up of the 
great American West and the distribution of initial property rights 
two centuries ago.”187 
Because of the substantial value these allocations would be given 
once the government recognized this valuable right to pollute, it is 
important that they are not given away. Aside from any possible 
unfair practices that could result, free allocation could also lead to 
windfall profits for beneficiaries who receive substantially more 
allocations than they need.188 Also, it is questionable why these 
polluters should receive the benefit of free allocations when it is the 
consumer who will ultimately be charged—it is estimated that 
consumers would pay eight times more than electric utilities for the 
use of the electricity, even after taking into consideration the costs of 
complying with a regulatory program, such as cap-and-trade.189 Even 
though there may be some advantages in giving allocations as 
 
 181. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 100. 
 182. See Westerfield, supra note 3, at 177. 
 183. Id. at 181. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 180. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 181. 
 189. Id. 
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compensation—to compensate businesses, for example, that are 
disproportionately affected by climate regulation or to encourage 
technological innovation190—these subsidies may be better obtained 
through tax credits. 
Besides avoiding the problems mentioned above, an auction 
approach could also provide valuable benefits. Cleaner technology, 
for instance, could be promoted with auction-generated funds. 
President Obama took this approach by proposing to use auction 
proceeds to fund $150 billion in clean energy projects over the next 
ten years beginning in 2012.191 And, as proposed by President 
Obama’s budget, this revenue could be used to serve as a tax break 
for the poor and others who would be most detrimentally affected by 
the transition to a clean energy economy.192 
C. Offsets 
It is important to note that this Comment has focused 
extensively on the necessity of reducing carbon emissions through 
cap-and-trade. A cap-and-trade system, however, would probably 
only focus on large energy producers, ignoring many other emitters 
of greenhouse gases. In order to reach these carbon emissions, it is 
important to allow emitters to meet targets through “carbon 
offsets.”193 
Emissions offsets are credits that can be earned through projects 
and other efforts that reduce greenhouse gases in areas that are not 
specifically listed under the cap in a cap-and-trade system.194 Those 
who are regulated under the cap can use these extra offsets to meet 
their emissions goals or sell them to others who may need them to 
satisfy their own obligations under the cap.195  
Offsets are generated from a variety of sources, but they are 
typically limited to larger endeavors, such as wind farm ventures or 
projects to remove the harmful greenhouse gases that escape from 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 21. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See DAVID J. HAYES, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, GETTING CREDIT FOR 
GOING GREEN 1 (2008), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/03/ 
pdf/carbon_offsets.pdf. 
 194. See Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 52; see also Westerfield, supra note 3, at 
186–87. 
 195. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 44–45. 
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garbage in landfills.196 Under the current offset system, the majority 
of these projects are being performed in China, but over forty-five 
countries are currently represented.197 
The offset market is voluntary, and some observers characterize it 
as uncertain and prone to fraud because of the confusion and lack of 
regulation in the market.198 Others also argue that allowing some 
entities to meet their emissions goals with offsets reduces the 
probability of meeting goals set by the cap.199 This can occur a few 
different ways. Individuals, for instance, may purchase offsets instead 
of decreasing emissions. An example of this behavior comes from Al 
Gore, a proponent of offsets, who defends his high level of 
consumption because he buys carbon offsets.200 Critics also argue 
that emissions goals would not be met because it can lead to 
difficulty in regulating and controlling the offset credits that could 
be awarded.201 Under the Kyoto Protocol, there have been reports 
that officials in China are lowering the requirements for offset 
projects and are awarding credits to marginal endeavors.202 Further, 
under Kyoto, there are complaints that industries are awarded offsets 
at very low costs and are ignoring needed changes.203 
Despite these challenges, there are many benefits that could 
accrue from the inclusion of carbon offsets in a cap-and-trade system. 
The primary benefit is that they could enable cap-and-trade to 
benefit sectors that are not under the cap, such as forestry and 
agricultural endeavors.204 This could be highly beneficial because 
some of the areas that are unlikely to be included under the cap 
contribute heavily to the greenhouse gas stockpile—tropical 
deforestation, for example, is estimated to account for twenty-
percent of global emissions.205 
 
 196. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 65–66. 
 197. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 53. 
 198. See HAYES, supra note 193, at 1, 7–8. 
 199. Id. at 15. 
 200. See Hardaway, supra note 60, at 986–87. Al Gore was criticized because he 
encouraged others to decrease their consumption while he continued to heat his large home 
and take private flights. Id. at 987. 
 201. See HAYES, supra note 193, at 7–8, 14. 
 202. Id. at 10. 
 203. Id. at 1 (citing David G. Victor & Danny Cullenward, Making Carbon Markets 
Work, SCI. AM., Dec. 2007, at 75–76). 
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 205. Id. at 13. 
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Offsets also provide a way for individuals to combat global 
warming. This is best exemplified by the growth in the voluntary 
carbon offset market. In 2004, this market was valued at 
approximately $6 million.206 In a mere two years, the market was in 
excess of $110 million.207 The voluntary carbon offset market is 
taking off, and there are more opportunities for individuals to 
participate every day. The vast potential of this important market can 
lead individuals to support corporate and government actions that 
would reduce greenhouse emissions. 
Because there is a possibility of abuse, it is important to establish 
procedures and verification of the actions that earn offset credits. 
Companies should not be able to circumvent their responsibility to 
comply under the cap by purchasing offsets. Rather, there should be 
a limit on the maximum amount of offsets they are able to produce. 
For example, under the Lieberman-Warner bill—a cap-and-trade 
proposal—regulated entities could only use offsets to reduce their 
commitment under the cap by fifteen percent.208 
D. Carbon as a Currency 
The key to a cap-and-trade system providing a reprieve from 
global warming is its ability to reduce global emissions of greenhouse 
gases. In order to ensure its success, it must be designed to integrate 
other cap-and-trade systems that reduce emissions on a global scale. 
This is difficult because the current carbon markets are insular: the 
new tradable units that are created are not yet recognized and are 
not freely exchangeable in other markets.209 These factors make 
global convergence of cap-and-trade systems problematic. To 
encourage the establishment of other systems and the exchange of 
credits internationally, the issue of what legal characteristic carbon 
credits will possess must be determined from the outset so that this 
definition can be uniformly applied on a global scale.210 
Although the unit of exchange for carbon in all markets is 
relatively uniform—it represents the right to emit greenhouse gas 
 
 206. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 67 (citing James Kanter, Guilt-Free 
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equivalent in greenhouse effect to one ton of carbon dioxide—it is 
likely that the value of these credits across markets will vary.211  The 
current industry practice, “particularly in the United States, [is] to 
treat emissions rights as commodities,” and the “legal and policy 
literature” has also referred to them in this respect.212 Their 
treatment as such is understandable due to some of the similarities 
that commodities and emissions rates share. Both, for example, “can 
be sold through spot trades for immediate delivery, or through 
futures contracts . . . .”213 Additionally, both are “generally made in 
very large volumes” and their prices can be particularly “fluid across 
time, but at any given time . . . [their price] will be generally uniform 
across the marketplace.”214 
Despite these similarities, it would be more beneficial to treat 
emissions units in another fashion to encourage global convergence; 
this can best be achieved by defining these units in a manner similar 
to that of currencies, a method supported by the International 
Accounting Standards Board.215 Emissions units and currencies have 
many similarities. Both, for example, are useless until the 
government establishes and enforces a property right in this area.216 
Commodities, in contrast, such as corn or oil, have value regardless 
of government endorsement.217 
The main benefits of a currency model are that it would promote 
environmental integrity, encourage convergence of market systems, 
create competition, and foster a desire for the most highly valued 
units.218 If carbon is listed as a commodity, the environmental 
integrity of the carbon units is jeopardized; the level of regulation 
between markets, for example, may vary and create a disparity 
between the environmental benefit of each carbon unit.219 Under 
this scenario, the treatment of all carbon units as equivalent is unfair 
 
 211. Id. at 573. 
 212. Id. at 575–76. 
 213. Id. at 576. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 579. 
 216. Id. at 577; see also Westerfield, supra note 3, at 180 (commenting that the intangible 
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and impractical. This problem could be avoided in a currency model 
because there can be different values at any given time—much like 
the fluctuation of the Mexican peso to the U.S. dollar—to take into 
account the environmental integrity of the unit.220  
Because units can be traded at different values, this encourages 
the convergence and trade of other carbon units in other markets. 
Although trading is not always encouraged between markets at the 
present time, a currency model would alter the status quo and 
facilitate exchange.221  
E. Enforcement 
The United States will need to play a central part in any plan to 
reduce carbon emissions. The vital role the United States can fulfill is 
to verify that emission limits are observed precisely, that the 
regulated entities comply, and make clear that if they do not, the 
government will enforce penalties for failure to maintain emissions 
below a cap.222 
The government’s primary responsibility after creating the cap-
and-trade system would be to regulate compliance within the system 
in order to achieve the desired level of emissions and to maintain the 
integrity of the traded credits.223 Although opponents of cap-and-
trade maintain that monitoring of a system is as difficult as obtaining 
an accurate reading of greenhouse gas emissions, in reality, much is 
possible. A cap-and-trade system focused on large industrial polluters 
would be able to monitor this sector to ensure these emissions goals 
are met.224 
Compliance and enforcement of this system, if comparable to the 
U.S. Acid Rain Program, should be relatively high. The U.S. Acid 
Rain Program has been one of the EPA’s most successful programs, 
in terms of compliance, with a ninety-nine percent compliance 
rate.225  
 The increased costs of bureaucracy that will no doubt result 
can be funded through the purchase of the credits on the market. 
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Offsets can also help funding. President Obama proposes an 
allocation of $19 million to the EPA to fund climate change 
research.226 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has focused on two difficult climate change 
questions that currently face policymakers: whether the United States 
should take action to mitigate climate change, and how to best 
reduce carbon emissions. The United States should recognize that 
climate change is occurring and that it will continue to have negative 
impacts if action is not taken. Even though it is possible global 
warming would not substantially affect the United States’ current 
Gross Domestic Product, it is likely that its economic and political 
rivals—China and Russia—stand to gain significantly from increases 
in global temperatures. To mitigate the United States’ rivals’ possible 
gains and to maximize its share of the ever-expanding global carbon 
market, the United States should implement a mandatory emissions 
reduction program.  
Of the two most recognized regulatory programs—carbon tax 
and cap-and-trade—a carbon tax would be the most administratively 
simple and timely method to reduce carbon emissions. Because 
carbon taxes are politically unsavory, however, both domestically and 
internationally, they are an unlikely solution to climate change.  
Cap-and-trade, a more complex and volatile system, is the 
political frontrunner and the solution proposed by President Obama 
and his administration. If designed correctly, cap-and-trade offers 
many of the same benefits as a carbon tax and also provides more 
certainty that environmental goals will be met. A cap-and-trade 
system should include the following components: a firm cap, a one-
hundred percent auction of allowances, carbon offsets, 
characterization of carbon in the same manner as a currency, and 
enforceability. If these measures are met, cap-and-trade will mitigate 
the environmental effects of climate change and ease the transition to 
a clean energy economy. 
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